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PARTICIPATION OF
NONGOVERNMENTAL PARTIES IN
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
EXTENSION OF STANDING IN WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION DISPUTES
TO NONGOVERNMENT PARTIES
PHILIP M. NICHOLS*
1. INTRODUCTION
Slightly more than one year ago, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade' went through a striking metamorphosis as it
was folded into the World Trade Organization. Whether the
ugly duckling3 that was the GATT has grown into a swan cannot
* Ronald Koenig Term Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, The WhartonSchool of the University of Pennsylvania. A.B., Harvard University; J.D.,
LL.M. (foreign and international law), Duke University.
1 See The Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement
on Tariffs & Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. This essay will follow the general usage and
refer to the document as the "General Agreement" and the quasi-institution
that evolved to administer the document as the "GATT."
2 See The WTO Enters into Force, Focus: GATT NEWsLETTER (GATT
Info. & Media Relations Div., Geneva), Dec. 1994, at 1; David E. Sanger, U.S.
Threatens $2.8 Billion of Tariffs on China Exports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1995, at
14. The GATT, as an institution, ceased to exist on Dec. 31, 1995. See Frances
Williams, GA7T's Spirit Lives on As Talk Marks Its Final Hour, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1995, at 5.
3 The General Agreement was awkward because it was neither a treaty nor
an institution but, out of necessity, developed attributes of both. "As an
institution, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a complex
and untidy thing. There is not even a consensus as to what it should be
called." Gardner Patterson & Eliza Patterson, The Road from GATT to MTO,
3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 35, 35 (1994) (footnote omitted). See infra note 40
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yet be stated with any certainty. What is certain, however, is that
the creation of the World Trade Organization represents a serious
change in the regulatory environment of international trade - a
change that, in turn, could affect the global economy on an
enormous scale.
Much of the World Trade Organization's potential effect is
quantifiable in dollars. Accompanying the creation of the World
Trade Organization are decreases in tariff and nontariff barriers
that should increase the value of the world economy by between
212 billion and 500 billion dollars. 4 The import of these interna-
tional regulatory changes is not, however, entirely numerical.
While agreements attached to the World Trade Organization's
charter do provide for reductions in tariffs,' the charter itself also
creates powerful new means of creating trade policies6 and
resolving disputes that arise under those policies.7 International
trade policy will no longer be created in separate, cumbersome
rounds of multilateral negotiations; instead, the World Trade
Organization will be a permanent forum in which trade policy
(discussing the history of the GATT).
4 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
MAY 1994, at 83, 86-87 (1994) (discussing estimates of the Uruguay Round's
effects on global income).
s See GATT Secretariat, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1165 (1994) (establishing schedules for tariff reduction) [hereinafter Final
Act]; see also Alan Riding, 109 Nations Sign Trade Agreement: 7 Years of Struggle
to Reduce Tariffs, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 16, 1994, at 35, 48 (stating that the Uruguay
Round Agreements would reduce industrial and agricultural tariffs by an
average of forty percent).
6 Two legislative bodies associated with the World Trade Organization -
the Ministerial Conference and the General Council - will formulate trade
policy. Under the overall guidance of the General Council, the World Trade
Organization Agreement establishes a Council for Trade in Goods, a Council
for Trade in Services, and a Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights. These Councils will: carry out functions assigned by the
General Council; establish their respective rules of procedure; be open to
representatives of all Members; meet as necessary to carry out their functions;
and establish subsidiary bodies as required. See Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Final Act, supra note 5, art. IV, 33 I.L.M. at 1145-
46 [hereinafter Charter].
7 The process for resolving trade disputes under a World Trade Organiza-
tion covered agreement is set forth in the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Final Act, supra note 5, 33
I.L.M. at 1226 [hereinafter Understanding].
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can be promulgated and fine-tuned.' Furthermore, the decisions
of trade dispute panels are no longer subject to veto by the losing
country; instead, the decisions of these panels will automatically
be adopted by the World Trade Organization.9
The import of these changes has not escaped the attention of
policymakers or scholars. In a recent article, 10 for example, this
author argues that the power of the World Trade Organization to
force national law into conformity with its trade norms is a
power that must be exercised with restraint." In particular, laws
that primarily reflect important underlying societal values and
only incidentally impede trade should not be subjected to scrutiny
by the World Trade Organization.
The trade agreements annexed to the World Trade Organiza-
tion charter act as a template against which national laws are
measured. A complaint may be lodged against one member by
another if the former's legal regime does not comply with the
template and the violation nullifies or impairs a benefit that is
supposed to accrue to the complaining member.12 If the com-
plaining member and the violating member cannot agree upon a
solution, then the complaint will be submitted to a dispute
resolution panel, which will operate in a quasi-judicial fashion."
If the dispute resolution panel does in fact find a violation, it will
"recommend that the Member concerned bring the [violative]
measure into conformity with" the trade agreements. 4 A panel
8 See Charter, supra note 6, art. 11(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1144 ("The WTO shall
provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations
among its Members in matters related to the agreements and associated legal
instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.").
9 See Understanding, supra note 7, arts. 16(4), 21, 33 I.L.M. at 1235, 1238.
10 See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 658
(1996).
n See id. at 700, 719.
12 See Understanding, supra note 7, arts. 3, 23, 33 I.L.M. at 1227-28, 1241-42.
In many cases, the nullification or impairment of a benefit is itself a violation
of the trade agreements. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 94 (1989).
13 See Understanding, supra note 7, arts. 6-12, 33 I.L.M. at 1230-34.
14 Id. art. 19(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1237 (footnote omitted). The first findingby
a panel convened by the World Trade Organization has made such a
recommendation. The complaint, brought by Venezuela and Brazil, involved
U.S. standards for reformulated gasoline. Such gasoline was required to be 15%
cleaner by 1995 than that sold in 1990. Each U.S. producer was allowed to
measure the improvement against the quality of the reformulated gasoline that
1996]
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decision, however, may not "add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements.""5 The panel's
decision is then voted on by the Dispute Settlement Body, or, if
the losing party so desires, the decision may be appealed to an
Appellate Body and then voted upon by the Dispute Settlement
Body.
16
Procedure aside, what is pertinent is the dispute resolution
process's mandate. In its legislative form, the World Trade
Organization has latitude to deal with the myriad ways in which
the promotion of global free trade intersects with other global
issues. In its quasi-judicial form, however, its mandate is limited
it actually produced in 1990, whereas foreign producers were held to a single,
and in most cases higher, standard. In keeping with a questionable (and in
practice almost always circumvented) rule that findings not be released until
final, the finding of the dispute resolutionpanel has not yet been made public.
Those who have read it, however, report that the panel opined that the United
States is free to do whatever it wishes with its environmental policy so long as
it does not discriminate against foreign producers and does not shelter domestic
producers.
While news of the panel's decision resulted in predictable election year
rhetoric, the finding itself is a nonevent. The differing standards are facially
discriminatory - the office of the United States Trade Representative itself
warned Congress several years ago of this fact. Additionally, Congress seems
to have been motivated in this instance not by environmental impulses, but
instead by a desire to protect U.S. producers. To illustrate, Congress, at the
insistence of domestic producers, ordered the Environmental Protection Agency
to stop work that the agency had begun on a unitary standard. Moreover, the
statute ceases to extend preferential treatment to U.S. producers by 1998, which
is about the same time that the dispute resolution process will render a final
ruling. Thus, before the process ultimately concludes, the issue could well be
moot. Venezuela, in fact, has indicated that even though the ruling was in its
favor, it has no plans to increase production of reformulated gasoline.
Finally, although this particular decision found a U.S. law to be violative,
it sets a precedent that generally will benefit U.S. producers. Similarly,
environmental advocates have argued that congressional protection of. the
domestic oil industry generally hinders environmental causes. See U.S. Charges
WTO Panel On Gasoline From Venezuela Exceeded Legal Mandate, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA), at 9 (Feb. 28, 1996); Bhushan Bahree, WTO Panel Rules Against
US. In Dispute Over Gasoline Norms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1996, at All; Paul
Blustein, WTO Ruling Draws Fierce Criticism, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1996, at
F3; Gerald Karey,,Regulation and the Environment, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS,
Feb. 5, 1996, at 3; Jane Knight, Despite Win, PDVSA Sits Tight On RFG,
PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, Jan. 17, 1996, at 4; David E. Sanger, World Trade
Group Orders U.S. to Alter Clean Air Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1996, at D1;
Frances Williams, US May Appeal Against WTO Ruling, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19,
1996, at 4; ... And the WITO Flaplet, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1996, at A18.
15 Understanding, supra note 7, art. 19(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1237.
16 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 700.
[17:1
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to review of national laws and legal regimes.17
Although limited, this mandate is far from trivial. Just as is
true of multinational legal regimes (and just as is true of local legal
regimes), national legal regimes often reflect underlying societal
values. 8 Laws that do not comport with such underlying
societal values are generally perceived not to be legitimate and
tend to be either short-lived or disregarded.' Every country
maintains a set of these societal values, of which free trade is only
one.2" Countries continually engage in evaluative or balancing
processes when coordinating these societal values, and the value of
free trade is not always preeminent.21 By contrast, the GATT
consistently" preferred free trade to expressions of other val-
ues.' Under the GATT's more mediative dispute resolution
process, in which panel decisions were subject to the review of all
of the parties to the GATT, this institutional bias to some extent
could be ameliorated. 24
17 The World Trade Organization could, of course, reach multinational
agreements by reviewing a nation's implementing legislation of a particular
treaty. It is interesting to note that while scholarly commentators argued that
environmental treaties such as the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species or the Montreal Protocol did in fact violate the General
Agreement, see, e.g., Janet McDonald, Greening the GATT- Harmonizing Free
Trade and Environmental Protection in the New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 397,
450-59 (1993), the question never came before a GATT panel. This reflects
either great prudence or great fortune on the part of the GATT.
1 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 670.
19 See id. at 671-72. As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, "The first require-
ment of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual
feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong." OLIVER W.
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 41 (1881).
20 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 702-05.
i Various countries restrain trade not for economic reasons but because the
prohibited or restrained item violates some belief or value of the prohibiting
country. Examples include France's restriction of U.S. movies, Saudi Arabia's
restriction of pornography, or the U.S. restriction of narcotics. See, e.g., id. at
703-04.
' But this practice was not without exception. For example, the General
Agreement itself contained a list of exceptions in Article 20, which included
legislation or action which was necessary to protect public morals or human,
plant, or animal life, which related to prison labor, or which was imposed to
protect national treasures. See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XX, 61 Stat. at
A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
23 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 700-02.
24 In the entire history of the GATT, it was necessary only one time for
the parties to authorize a complaining country to undertake compensatory
1996]
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The rigidity of the dispute resolution process in the World
Trade Organization, however, presents a special danger. To the
extent that the World Trade Organization forces countries to
reform their laws so as to exalt the value of free trade over other
values, the empirical legitimacy of national laws could be
eroded.25 Countries asked to choose between obedience to the
World Trade Organization and having empirically legitimate laws
may choose to ignore the World Trade Organization.26
The compliance of member countries is critical to the efficacy
of the World Trade Organization. Unlike the International
Labour Organization, for example, which extends membership to
unions and special interest groups,' or INTELSAT, which is
composed of quasi-commercial agencies,28 the World Trade
Organization membership is comprised solely of countries.29 In
the absence of any coercive power with which to enforce its rules,
the World Trade Organization ultimately depends upon the
voluntary compliance of its members.30
Thus it is critical to the survival of the free trade regime that
measures for the violative acts of another party. See Netherlands, Measures of
Suspension of Obligations to the United States, Nov. 8, 1952, GATT BISD 1st
Supp. 32 (1953); see also ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND
WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 191-98 (2d ed. 1990) (explicating to the Nether-
lands Action initiated in response to U.S. restrictions on dairy imports).
" See Nichols, supra note 10, at 707.
26 See id.
27 See Nicolas Valticos, International Labour Law, in 1 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 29 (Roger
Blanpain ed., 1983 & supps.).
28 See Nicolas M. Matte, Institutional Arrangementsfor International Space
Activities, in SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 97, 99-100 (Nandasiri
Jasentuliyana ed., 1992) (INTELSAT is "an international organization and an
international enterprise, operating on a commercial basis and as a public utility
service").
219 Membership will also be extended to any "separate customs territory
possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations."
Charter, supra note 6, art. XXII(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1150. Hong Kong, for
example, will join the World Trade Organization as a member rather than as
part of the People's Republic of China.
30 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 708; see also ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNA-
TIONAL COOPERATION 73-74 (1989) (stating that defiance of any treaty creates
a risk that the cooperative structure built around that treaty will collapse); Guy
de Jonqui~res, Dreams Behind the Scenes, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1995, at 11
(asserting that if the World Trade Organization's "'authority is once eroded by
a big trading power, that will be the end of the [World Trade Organization]'")
(quoting "a senior trade official").
[17:1
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the World Trade Organization adopt an exception that will
accommodate societal values. The appropriate exception would
state that laws primarily codifying an underlying societal value
and only incidentally hindering free trade should not be subject
to World Trade Organization scrutiny.3 x  This exception to
World Trade Organization scrutiny could be enacted by the
legislative body of the World Trade Organization32 or, more
likely, fashioned as a doctrine by the Dispute Settlement Body or
the Appellate Body.3  While administration of this exception
would require an inquiry into the motive for the creation of a
law, such inquiries are routinely undertaken by both domestic and
international tribunals. 4 Indeed, evidence of societal values
would be similar to evidence of custom, which is a source of
international law, and evidence of which is often parsed by
international tribunals. Placing a real burden of proof on the
31 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 708.
32 See id. at 709-11.
13 See id. at 712-13; see also Philip M. Nichols, GA 7T Doctrine, 36 VA. J.
INT'L L. (forthcoming May 1996) (discussing creation of doctrine by GATT
dispute panels).
34 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 714-16. Courts in the United States have
been required to inquire as to legislative purpose when considering legislation
relating to bills of attainder, the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and the Commerce Clause. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
% 11.7, 15.9(c), 18.4, 20.49 (2d ed. 1992). Similarly, the European Court of
Justice inquires into legislative purpose. See, e.g., Case C-312/89, Union
Departementale des Syndicats CGT de L'Aisne v. SIDEF Conforma and
Others, 3 C.M.L.R 746, 759 (1993) (requiring review into purpose); Nichols,
supra note 10, at 715. GATT panels themselves examined the legislative
purpose behind laws. See e.g., United States, Measures Affecting Alcoholic and
Malt Beverages, GATT BISD 39th Supp. 206, 276-77 (1993) (conducting an
inquiry into whether a law was passed for protectionist purposes or for the
purpose of effecting a legitimate regulatory goal).
" To constitute custom, a country's behavior must not only consist of a
general practice, it must also be accepted by that country as obligatory. See
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187. Thus, a court that is ascertaining the existence
of custom must ascertain the beliefs and values of a sovereign and a society.
Evidence that is parsed by the courts include diplomatic correspondence, policy
statements, press releases, opinions of official legal advisors, policy manuals,
executive practices, comments by government officials, domestic legislation, and
patterns of behavior. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 4-5 (4th ed. 1990). It should be noted that GATT panels were
no strangers to this type of evidence. See, e.g., Norway, Restrictions on
Imports of Apples and Pears, June 22, 1989, GATT BISD 36th Supp. 306, 321
1996]
7
Nichols: Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Non
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
party claiming the exception, rather than simply allowing that
party to claim the exception, would mitigate the possibility that
this exception would be used as a pretext for the enactment of
protectionist laws.
3 6
This argument has been criticized as not going far enough.
Professor Richard Shell, in a recently published article of his own,
damns the value-based argument for World Trade Organization
restraint with faint praise and endorses a theoretical model he calls
the "Trade Stakeholder Model."37  Shell's model, in its simplest
form, argues for "broad participation in trade dispute resolution
for all parties with a stake in trade policy, not just commercial
parties."" Although Shell is admittedly vague about how such
participation should occur, his discussion and examples point to
an expansion of the universe of parties with standing before
World Trade Organization dispute panels, thus allowing private
parties, as well as governments, to argue before those tribunals. 39
While Professor Shell's contribution to the understanding of
(1990) (reviewing series of Norwegian legislative actions).
36 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 716-17. In the context of judicial inquiry
into legislative purpose in the United States, Paul Brest has noted that supposed
problems in ascertainability of purpose are largely illusory, and that both
circumstantial and direct evidence often exist to explain the motivations of
lawmakers. See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problems
of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95, 120-24. He also
argues that the occasional impossibility of determining motive "does not justify
a blanket refusal to undertake the inquiry if a decisionmaker's motivation can
sometimes be determined with adequate certainty." Id. at 120. Moreover,
placing the burden on the party claiming the exception would mean that when
it could not be determined with a degree of certainty whether or not a law
actually expressed an underlying societal value, the exception would not apply.
It is, of course, slightly possible that protectionist laws occasionally would
escape World Trade Organization scrutiny by means of this exception. If,
however, systems of governance and legal regimes were held to a standard of
absolute perfection, then systems of governance and legal regimes would cease
to exist. The argument is not that the proposed exception is flawless; rather,
the argument is that a system of trade governance that accommodates national
expressions of societal values is superior to a system of trade governance that
does not.
"' See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory:
An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE LJ. 829, 921 (1995).
11 Id. at 911.
'9 For example, Shell points to the influence of workers' and employers'
organizations on the International Labour Organization. See id. at 916. He
uses as another example the European Union, which extends standing. to
individual citizens in many areas. See id. at 918.
[17:1
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the role of trade in the social edifice is extremely valuable, his
argument for the expansion of standing must be viewed with
caution. It is possible that his argument is based on implicit
assumptions that do not comport with reality. Moreover,
expansion of standing might erode many of the gains made over
the past fifty years by countries working within the GATT. This
essay examines the assumptions implicit in the argument to
expand standing, explains why those assumptions are unsound,
and poses the argument against expansion of standing. As a
superior alternative to expansion of standing, this essay suggests
changing the composition of dispute settlement panels. Before
undertaking this analysis, however, this essay briefly discusses the
nature of the World Trade Organization, in order to emphasize
that the change being discussed - an extension of standing to
nongovernment parties - would be a fundamental change to the
World Trade Organization rather than a simple procedural
modification.
2. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION Is AN
ORGANIZATION OF NATIONS
Providing standing to nongovernment entities is not a simple
procedural change; rather, it goes to the very essence of the
GATT and the World Trade Organization - entities conceived
of and designed as forums in which governments, not private
parties, formulate trade policy. This emphasis on governmental
interaction can be demonstrated both historically and operational-
ly.
The GATT - which endured for almost fifty years - was an
orphan of the proposed International Trade Organization. 4° In
4 The General Agreement was pieced together as a stopgap measure to
bridge the period between the end of negotiations among the industrialized
nations and-the ratification of the International Trade Organization charter by
those nations. Thus, the General Agreement was never conceived of as a
treaty, but was instead an agreement acceded to through a Protocol of
Provisional Application. Moreover, the negotiating power that Congress
conferred upon the United States executive branch regarding this temporary
measure specifically excluded any reference to an international organization.
In fact, allreferences to an international organization were deleted from the
General Agreement. The United States Senate eventually failed, because of
sovereignty concerns, to ratify creation of the International Trade Organiza-
tion. The "temporary" General Agreement became the means to regulate
international trade policy for the ensuing fifty years. For excellent histories of
1996]
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turn, the International Trade Organization was to serve as the
third leg of a global economic tripod forged at Bretton Woods in
the waning years of World War 11.41 Although the U.S. Con-
gress killed the International Trade Organization, 42 the other two
legs - the International Monetary Fund and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (better known as the
World Bank) - became principal actors in the global economic
order.43 Most notably, the Bretton Woods negotiations were
conducted at the highest levels of government and involved critical
issues regarding the sovereignty of those nations. 44 Even today,
the International Monetary Fund limits membership to sovereign
countries; member governments appoint its managers; and only
the General Agreement and its evolution into the foremost international
trading body, see ROBERT E. HUDEc, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND
WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 49-52 (2d ed. 1990); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 36-53 (1969).
Interestingly, one of the reasons that the negotiators of the International
Trade Organization felt a need for an interim agreement was to protect the
delicate bargain that had been struck from the influences of special interest
groups. William Diebold, who has been closely involved in trade negotiations,
reports that "I was told that Will Clayton said that 'we need to act before the
vested interests get their vests on.' Whether he really said that, I don't know,
but it makes the point." William Diebold, Reflections on the International Trade
Organization, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 335, 336 (1994).
41 See Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal
Order or World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 352 (1995) (discussing "the
three legs upon which the new multilateral economic system should rest").
Interestingly, Peter Sutherland, the first Director-General of the World Trade
Organization, has spoken of the World Trade Organization as one of the
Bretton Woods institutions, even though it was created in 1995, almost fifty
years after the two other Bretton Woods institutions. See Peter Sutherland,
Open For Trade: The First Three Months of the WITO, Focus: WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION NEWSLETTER (Info. & Media Relations Div. of the WTO,
Geneva), Mar.-Apr., 1995, at 12, 13.
42 See Ruth E. Olson, GAT - Legal Application of Safeguards in the
Context of Regional Trade Arrangements and Its Implications for the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1488, 1491 (1989)
("When the United States Congress failed to ratify the International Trade
Organization, the negotiating countries reverted to the GATT as an existing
legal framework.") (footnote omitted).
4' A full history of the Bretton Woods negotiations, while fascinating, is
beyond the scope of this essay. For a truly interesting historical treatment, see
ARMAND VAN DORMAEL, BRETTON WOODS: BIRTH OF A MONETARY
SYSTEM (1978) (tracing the history of the Bretton Woods system, including its
success and failure).
I See id. at 168-223.
[17:1
10
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 10
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss1/10
EXTENSION OF STANDING
governments receive lending assistance.4  Similarly, sovereign
nations own the World Bank; those nations that manage the Bank
appoint the governors; and the Bank makes or arranges for loans
only to governments or government related entities.46
The World Trade Organization is the culmination of eight
years of multinational negotiations.47  The Uruguay Round
negotiations, like those at Bretton Woods, took place at the
intergovernmental level. The participating countries, however,
did solicit comments from business, other nongovernmental
entities, and the public in general. For example, a variety of U.S.
agencies - including the United States Trade Representative, the
Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and the
International Trade Commission - solicited public comments on
issues such as environmental implications of the Uruguay
Round,48 the impact of the Uruguay Round on various indus-
tries,49 the integration of various industries into the GATT,5"
45 See 4 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL SERIES, THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND xiii-xvi (Anne C.M. Salda ed., 1992).
46 See BAREND A. DE VRIES, REMAKING THE WORLD BANK 8-10 (1987).
The IMF and the World Bank have been the subject of their share of criticism.
Interestingly, that criticism includes lack of transparency and democracy as well
as lack of independent appeals for private groups affected by IMF and World
Bank activity. See John Cavanaugh et al., Introduction: From Bretton Woods to
Chiapas, in BEYOND BRETTON WOODS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE GLOBAL
ECONOMIC ORDER xii, xv (ohn Cavanaugh et al. eds., 1994).
47 These negotiations - launched on September 20, 1986, in Punta del Este,
Uruguay, substantially concluded on December 15, 1993, and formally
concluded in Marrakesh, Morocco on April 15, 1994 - are cumulatively
referred to as the "Uruguay Round" of multilateral negotiations. See JEFFREY
J. SCHOTT & JOHANNA W. BUURMAN, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN
ASSESSMENT 3 (1994). For a thorough history of the negotiations between 1986
and 1992, see THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: NEGOTIATING HISTORY
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
48 See, e.g., United States Trade Representative, Report on Environmental
Issues in the Uruguay Round Agreements, 59 Fed. Reg. 9802 (1994) (announc-
ing notice and request for public comment).
49 See, e.g., International Trade Commission, Potential Impact on the U.S.
Economy and Industries of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreements, 59 Fed.
Reg. 15218 (1994) (announcing the institution of an investigation of and calling
for public submissions on the Uruguay Round's effect on various sectors of the
national economy); Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications
and Information Administration, Comprehensive Examination of U.S.
Regulation of International Telecommunications Services, 58 Fed. Reg. 4846
(1993) (announcing notice of inquiry and request for comments); International
Trade Commission, Probable Economic Effect of Multilateral Removal of
Trade Barriers on Imports of Sugar, Meat, Peanuts, Cotton, and Dairy
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and the reduction or elimination of tariffs on particular goods.51
Congress, which does not have negotiating powers, also actively
solicited public comment 2 and promulgated its own views.53
Other major trading countries elicited public input in a similar
manner. In Canada, for example, the Department of Finance, the
International Trade Tribunal, and the Department of External
Affairs and International Trade each held public hearings on trade
negotiations. 4 Established trading nations were not alone in
receiving public input. Emerging economies also utilized various
methods of obtaining inputs from entities outside of the govern-
ment.55
Products, 55 Fed. Reg. 28467 (1990) (announcing institution of investigation and
notice of hearing).
50 See, e.g., Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements,
Request for Public Comments on the Integration of the Textiles and Clothing
Sector into the GATT 1994, 59 Fed. Reg. 26212 (1994) (requesting information
of the ramifications of integrating textiles into the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments); Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration
Exporters' Textile Advisory Committee, Open Meeting, 55 Fed. Reg. 49099
(1990) (discussing Uruguay Round negotiations).
51 See, e.g., Department of State, Advisory Committee on International
Investment, Meeting, 56 Fed. Reg. 43832 (1991) (announcing notice of meeting);
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Uruguay Round Negotiations
on Tariff and Non-Tariff Measures, 54 Fed. Reg. 38311 (1989) (announcing
notice of public hearings and request for written comments); International
Trade Commission, Intent to Hold MTN Field Hearings, 53 Fed. Reg. 47589
(1988) (announcing notice of intent to hold hearings); Office of the United
States Trade Representative, Trade Policy Staff Committee, Articles Being
Considered for Possible Duty Removal, 53 Fed. Reg. 30920 (1986) (announcing
notice and schedule of public hearings).
52 See, e.g., Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearings before
the Subcomm. on rrade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1993) (reprinting a press release announcing hearings).
" See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 64, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 4 1991) stating
that U.S. negotiators must address "environmental concerns, helh and safety
standards, labor and industry adjustment.. . and worker rights").
54 See, e.g., Department of Finance, Invitation to Submit Comments on
Proposed Tariff Reductions on Manufacturing Inputs, 128 C. Gaz. 2790 (pt. I
1994) (inviting public comment on proposed tariff reductions); Canadian
International Trade Tribunal, Competitiveness of the Canadian Cattle and Beef
Industries, 126 C. Gaz. 3681 (pt. 11992) (announcing notice of public hearings);
see also External Affairs and International Trade Canada, North American Free
Trade Negotiations, 125 C. Gaz. 2698 (pt. 1 1991) (noting in its solicitation of
comments that the International Trade Advisory Group on International Trade
provided advice on Uruguay Round negotiations).
55 See, e.g., Ashok V. Desai, The Politics of India's Trade Policy, in
DOMESTIC POITICS AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 91, 96-102 (Henry R. Nau
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Nonetheless, although governments paid heed to the com-
ments and concerns of private entities, the actual Uruguay Round
negotiations were undertaken by and among governments, and
not by the citizens whom those governments represent. 6
Given the results of these negotiations, Professor Shell's focus
on dispute resolution is understandable.57  The World Trade
ed., 1989) (noting that while India's trade agreements are negotiated by elected
officials, many groups, including consumers, have inputs); J. Ray Kennedy &
Roberto Giannetti da Fonseca, Brazilian Trade Policy and the Uruguay Round,
in id. at 29, 40-42 (stating that industry, trading companies, and agriculture
"have some influence over government decisions" regarding the Uruguay
Round); Kim Kihwan & Chung Hwa Soo, Korea's Domestic Trade Politics and
the Uruguay Round, in id. at 135, 145 ("[N]ongovernmental actors have
considerable access to the core of the trade policy making system, the executive
branch. They can present their case to officials from the relevant ministry,
both formally and informally, and at various levels.").
6 See generally Arthur Dunkel, 'Trade Policies for a Better Future' and the
Uruguay Round, in TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FuTURE: THE 'LEUTWILER
REPORT,' THE GATT AND THE URUGUAY ROuND 1, 1 (1987) (describing the
Uruguay Round as "the most far-reaching, comprehensive and significant
multilateral trade negotiation ever undertaken" and noting that "the magnitude
of this enterprise willpose a formidable challenge to the participants in terms
of their imagination, farsightedness and political will").
" In fairness, it should be noted that Shell also suggests that nongovern-
mental parties should play a role in policymaking. See Shell, supra note 37, at
922. Such, however, is already the case. Although countries will not allow
others to bargain in their place, the GATT, almost since its inception, worked
closely with, consulted, and even considered motions by international
nongovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the IMF, and the
International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"). See, e.g., Committee on
Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT BISD 39th Supp. 448, 448 (1993) (stating
"seven international organizations are invited to attend meetings of the
Committee in an observer capacity"); Committee on Customs Valuation,
GATT BISD 39th Supp. 396, 396 (1993) (listing representatives of four
countries that are not parties to the GATT but which do attend meetings, as
do the Customs Co-operation Council, the IMF, and UNCTAD); Report
(1981) of the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT BISD 28th
Supp. 34, 34 (1982) (stating that IMF, UNCTAD, ISO, IEC, and FAO/WHO
attend meetings); Italian Import Deposit, Report of the Working Party, Oct.
21, 1971, GATT BISD 21st Supp. 121, 122 (1975) (thanking the representatives
of the IMF for the "statement on Italy's balance of payments and measures
taken to restore equilibrium in the country's economy and external position");
International Trade Centre UNCTAD/GATT, Report of the Joint Advisory
Group, Nov. 25, 1968, GATT BISD 16th Supp. 98, 98 (1969) (stating that
"experts and advisers in the field of trade information and trade promotion
from a large number of countries and inter-governmental organizations
participated in the meeting"); Trade and Customs Regulations: Certificates of
Origin, Marks of Origin, Consular Formalities, Nov. 17, 1956, GATT BISD
5th Supp. 102, 102 (1957) (stating that a working party considers proposals
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Organization will perform at least three functions: surveillance of
member countries' trade policies;" negotiation of substantive
international trade policies and regulations; 9 and resolution of
disputes between members concerning those trade policies.1°
Review of trade policy occupies a low-profile position in debate
over trade regulation. On the other hand, because negotiating
trade policy inherently involves a yielding of sovereignty,"' it is
from the ICC); Customs Administration: Nationality of Imported Goods, Oct.
23, 1953, GATT BISD 2d Supp. 53, 53-54 (1954) (noting that parties to the
GATT vote on a motion submitted by the I C); alance-of-Payments
Quantative Restrictions: Consultation Procedure Under Article XII:4(a), June
20, 1949, 2 GATT BISD 89, 93 (1952) (stating "consultations under paragraph
4(a) of Article XII involve very close co-operation with the International
Monetary Fund").
The World Trade Organization appears to continue this practice. The
charter of the World Trade Organization states that "[t]he General Council
shall make appropriate arrangements for effective cooperation with other
intergovernmental organizations that have responsibilities related to those"
undertaken by the World Trade Organization. Charter, supra note 6, art. V(
33 I.L.M. at 1146. The charter goes on to state that the World Trade
Organization may also "make appropriate arrangements for consultation and
cooperation with non-governmental organizations." Id. art. V(2), 33 I.L.M. at
1146. Although it is probable that some fine tuning could occur in these
arrangements, structurally the door has been opened. The real, and significant,
change that Shell calls for is the expansion of standing to include nongovern-
ment parties.
s The primary mechanisn of surveillance is the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism. See Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, reprinted in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, THE
LEGAL TEXTS Annex 3 (1994) [hereinafter LEGAL TEXTS]. Trade policy review
was previously conducted pursuant to a Decision by parties to the GATT. See
Functioning of the GATT System, Apr. 12, 1989, GATT BISD 36th Supp. 403,
405 (1990).
" Two legislative bodies - the Ministerial Conference which meets at least
every two years and the General Council which meets at all times in between
- carry out the functions of the World Trade Organization. See Charter, supra
note 5, art. IV, 33 I.L.M. at 1145. One function of the legislative bodies will
be to "provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their
multilateral trade relations." Id. art. 1I(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1145; see also Nichols,
supra note 10, at 691-93 (discussing the policymaking role of the WTO);
Patterson & Patterson, supra note 3, at 42 discussing legislative process in the
World Trade Organization).
o See supra note 7; infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
6i See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies:
Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1232-33 (1992) ("Issues
formerly thought to be well within the exclusive terrain of national sovereign-
ties, such as exchange rates and taxing policies, now must be examined for their
impact on trade liberalization or barriers.").
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unlikely that member countries would be willing to entrust
negotiations involving sovereignty to any entity other than them-
selves. Thus, only dispute resolution remains as an area for
nongovernment party involvement. Moreover, dispute resolution
is the most visible point of contact between private parties and the
functioning of the World Trade Organization and thus is a
significant area of concern for the stakeholder proposal.
The creation of the World Trade Organization effected a
significant change in the nature of dispute resolution. Since 1955,
disputes between countries that cannot be resolved through
consultation have been referred to dispute panels.62  Panels
receive submissions and hear arguments both from representatives
of the disputing governments and from interested third party
countries.63 The panel then rules on the applicability of the
appropriate trade agreement to the dispute and recommends what
action the GATT or World Trade Organization should take.
64
Within the GATT, dispute resolution was a mediative process.65
Dispute panel decisions became final only after the parties to the
GATT adopted them by consensus. Since consensus requires an
absence of negative votes, any country - even the party losing
before a panel - could veto a panel ruling.6 6  This dynamic
explicitly encouraged political accommodation.
The dispute resolution process under the World Trade
Organization reverses the process of decision adoption. Panel
62 See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 63 (1999)
(discussing the arbitration-oriented process utilized by GATT dispute panels
since 1955).
61 See Understanding, supra note 7, arts. 10-12, 33 I.L.M. at 1232-34.
' See HUDEC, supra note 40, at 92; JACKSON, supra note 40, at 63; Rosine
Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GA TPanel Works and Does Not, J.
INT'L ARB., Dec. 1987, at 53.
61 See JACKSON, supra note 40, at 65 n.5.
6 See id. at 65. "Consensus comes close to [but is not] unanimity. It is,
rather, a state of non-objection, a resigned let-it-go." Pierre Pescatore, The
GA 7T Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Its Present Situation and Its Prospects, J.
INT'L ARB., Mar. 1993, at 35.
67 See Fred L. Morrison, The Future of International Adjudication, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 827, 838 (1991) ("The relative success of the GATT mechanism has
been because of, not in spite of, its recognition of a political role in the
process."). Frequently, the result of this mediative process was palatable to
both disputing countries. See Plank, supra note 64, at 88-92 (describing how
contracting parties act on a panel report).
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decisions - or appellate decisions68 - will automatically be
adopted unless all of the votes are against adoption.69 In other
words, whereas under the GATT system the sole vote of the
losing party could prevent adoption of a panel decision, under the
World Trade Organization system the sole vote of the winning
party can force adoption. It cannot, however, be argued that this
dramatic change indicates that governments are no longer
concerned with the dispute settlement process. If anything, the
additional weight placed upon panel reports makes the dispute
settlement process even more critical to the functioning of the
World Trade Organization and to the substantive rights of
member nations.70
The fact that the World Trade Organization is an organization
of nations, and that dispute resolution has been and will continue
to be a process among nations, does not necessarily mean that
expansion of standing to include nongovernment entities is a bad
idea. It does mean that expansion of standing is more than a mere
procedural change, and is a suggestion that should be neither
lightly made nor blithely taken. Indeed, expansion of standing
presents several issues that demand close scrutiny and careful
thought.
3. GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION OF CONSTITUENCIES
Professor Shell's suggestion of expanding standing beyond
member nations implicitly assumes that national governments do
not adequately represent the interests of all of their constituencies.
The capacity of democratic governments to represent the values
of their constituencies is especially pertinent to a discussion about
trade disputes because the bulk of world trade, and therefore the
68 The Understanding on dispute resolution provides the right to an appeal
before an appellate board of trade judges. See Understanding, supra note 7, art.
17, 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
69 See id. art. 16, 33 I.L.M. at 1235; Nichols, supra note 10, at 700.
70 Indeed, the United States has proposed a five-judge panel that will review
decisions against the United States. If, within a five year period, these judges
determine that three negative decisions exceed the scope or authority of the
World Trade Organization, then Congress will consider a resolution to
withdraw from the World Trade Organization altogether. See S. Res. 16, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Review
Commission Act), 141 CoNG. REc. S176, S176 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995); see also
Terry Atlas, Job Worries at Root of GA TT Fears; Many Prefer Security of Present
to Future Potential, Cm. TRtB., Nov. 7, 1994, at C1 (describing the panel).
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majority of trade disputes, occurs between democratic coun-
tries. 72
There is much anecdotal criticism of government. 73 From a
more disciplined and analytical perspective, political theory also
teaches that democratic institutions are not perfect. 74  There is
little consensus on what democracy is,7' how the process
works, 76 or which of the various democratic models is most
effective. 7  Nonetheless, the mainstream consensus is that
democratic governments do function to fairly assess, evaluate, and
coordinate various societal values and goals. 78  This is true of
71 See Robert E. Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile of the GATT Dispute
Settlement Cases: 1948-1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 29-30 (1993)
(reporting that only 17 of 207 cases did not involve either the United States or
European Union nations).
72 See Democracy and Growth: Why Voting is Good for You, ECONOMIST,
Aug. 27, 1994, at 15 (stating that "nearly all of the world's richest countries are
... democratic"); see also John F. Helliwell, Empirical Linkages Between
Democracy and Economic Growth, 24 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 225, 233-35 (1994)
(finding a significant correlation between national wealth and democracy, and
a positive effect of increased income on democracy).
"I See virtually any statement by virtually any opposition candidate in
virtually any election year.
4 See, e.g., Phillipe C. Schmitter, Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy, J.
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1994, at 57, 62-63 (listing problems with democratic
institutions, including oligarchic nonaccountability, freeriding, policy recycling,
nonaccountable necessary institutions, and transnational interdependence).
75 See GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 257-
75 (1987) (devoting 18 pages to not answering the question of what democracy
is).
76 See Charles R. Beitz, Procedural Equality in Democratic Theory: A Prelimi-
nary Examination, in LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: NOMOS XXV 69 (. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983) (arguing that different commentators
have various opinions on the specific procedures required in a political system
in order for a country to be considered a "democracy").
' See, e.g., Kaare Strom, Democracy as Political Competition, in REEXAM-
INING DEMOCRACY 27, 28, 34 (Garry Mark & Larry Diamond eds., 1992)
(describing a debate among Seymour Martin Lipset, who argues that effective
democracy is a competition for political office, Crawford Macpherson, who
argues that democracy is oligopolistic, and Jane Mansbridge, who argues that
democracy is adversarial).
71 See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 106-18 (1989)
(discussing the distinctive characteristics of a democratic process of government
through an analysis of the assumptions and criteria of a democratic political
order); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN 27 (expanded ed., 1981)
(stating that a democracy without an underlying value system will result in
chaos); J. ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 159 (1979)
(stating that "democracy tends to 'maximize' the values of liberty and equality
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trade policy as well.79
The fact that existing democratic institutions are not perfect
allows for some refinement of the assumption underlying Shell's
suggestion. Professor Shell's suggestion could be ascribed not to
an implicit assumption that governments do not balance values,
but instead to an assumption that the World Trade Organization
will do so more effectively, and therefore the governed should
indicate their preferences directly to the World Trade Organiza-
tion. Indeed, Shell hints that this is his assumption when he
characterizes his model as "participatory governance," in contrast
to the World Trade Organization's use of representative democra-
cy.
80
Scholars of democratic theory, however, argue that participato-
ry governance is impossible on a global scale. Robert Dahl points
out the fundamental paradox of the large political systems
necessary to deal with transnational problems:
In very small political systems a citizen may be able to
participate extensively in decisions that do not matter
much but cannot participate much in decisions that really
matter a great deal; whereas very large systems may be able
to cope with problems that matter more to a citizen, the
opportunities for the citizen to participate in and greatly
influence decisions are vastly reduced. 1
and... respect for persons").
'9 After an exhaustive study of the relationship between democracy and
trade policy, Daniel Verdier concludes:
Voters control policymaking because elections provide policymakers
with incentives to reproduce within their institutional microcosms the
parametric structure of the electorate. Voters signal to their elected
representatives the balance between particular and general goals that
they wish to see struck by the legislative process. Voter control is
indirect, since voters do not choose the outcome; rather, they create
the incentive structure that motivates politicians to legislate in
accordance with voter concerns. In short, if electors do not necessarily
choose policies, they do choose the decision rules by which lawmakers
make policies.
DANIEL VERDIER, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 290 (1994).
so See Shell, supra note 37, at 914.
S Robert A. Dahl, A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus
Citizen Participation, 109 POL. SCI. Q. 23, 28 (1994).
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Although it is beyond peradventure that the World Trade
Organization will be required to balance interests that affect the
entire world, it is difficult to envisage a scheme that could
equitably allow for direct participation by all of the citizens of the
world. Moreover, on a purely empirical level, the policy of
subsidiarity in the European Union," and the appeal of "states'
rights" rhetoric in the United States, 3 indicate a popular desire
to keep value balancing as close to local levels as possible.
The best case for Professor Shell's assumptions lies with
nondemocratic members of the World Trade Organization. While
these countries are not involved in a significant number of trade
disputes, they should not be ignored, particularly given the
likelihood that the People's Republic of China will become a
member of the World Trade Organization.84 It is possible that
in nondemocratic countries certain constituencies are not allowed
a voice in the balancing of values.8" To the extent that this is
true, however, the same factors that preclude those constituencies
from participation at the national level will also preclude partici-
pation at the international level. It is unlikely, for example, that
" Subsidiarity is the policy of handling issues such as taxation, regulation,
and providing public security at a local decentralized level of government. See
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH, MAKING SENSE OF
SUBSlDIARRTY: How MUCH CENTRALIZATION FOR EUROPE? 3-4, 19-23 (1993);
George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331 (1994) (explaining
and analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the principle of subsidiarity and
concluding that "it 'fits' the European Community at its present juncture").
83 See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Senate Votes to Repeal Helmet Laws, WASH. POST,
June 22, 1995, at Al (discussing the Senate's continued efforts to take power
from the federal government and give it to the states).
84 See Tony Walker, Survey of China, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1995, at 3
(discussing China's progress in gaining World Trade Organization membership).
But see Knock, Knock, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1996, at 72 (indicating that although
China has "made much progress in the past year or so" there are still
problematic issues, such as human rights an intellectual property protection,
that block its entry into the World Trade Organization).
" It is only possible, not certain, that nondemocratic countries exclude
constituencies from the value balancing process. Even nondemocratic regimes
tend to represent their constituencies to some degree, particularly when such
regimes wish to be considered legitimate. See J. Roland Pennock, Political
Representation: An Overview, in REPRESENTATION: NOMOS X 3, 6-8 a. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1968) ("All regimes obtain legitimacy by
being in some degree representative or at least convincing their subjects that
they are.").
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a group of human rights activists would be allowed to leave
Burma to participate in a proceeding in Geneva, or, having
somehow done so, would find a comfortable reception waiting at
home. 6
Proponents of expanded standing may counter that, because
constituencies in nondemocratic regimes cannot speak for
themselves, the need to allow somebody else to speak for them is
especially critical. This, however, already occurs within the
existing system. For example, both France and the United States
have proposed that the World Trade Organization consider labor
rights.8 7 The rights of groups with little power, such as children
and forced laborers, are of special concern to the two countries.88
Part of the impetus for this concern is the desire to protect high
paying jobs in democratic countries. Part of the impetus for this
concern is the altruistic belief that some practices are morally
wrong. 9 But regardless of the impetus, the governments of
France and the United States have synthesized and balanced a
number of values in order to arrive at their positions. Moreover,
nontrade values that benefit nonconstituents are represented,
through governments, at the World Trade Organization.
4. PLACING TRADE POLICY IN THE ADVERSARIAL ARENA
The expansion of standing not only belies the reality of how
6 See Ted Bardacke, Red Cross Office in Burma to Shut, FIN. TIMES, June
20, 1995, at 10 ("[T]he Burmese government has become less sensitive to
international complaints about human rights conditions in the country, as
foreign investment... has poured in."); Philip Shenon, Burma Unlikely to Free
Dissident When Detention Term Ends, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1995, at A3
(reporting that Burma threatens to keep human rights activist imprisoned
indefinitely); James Strachan, How to Spend It: The Dark Side of the Sun, FIN.
TIMES, June 10, 1995, at VI (describing use of political and other prisoners as
human minesweepers). Burma was a party to the General Agreement, see
GATT 1947, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at A8, 55 U.N.T.S. at 188, and is a signatory
to the World Trade Organization charter, see Final Act, supra note 5, 33 I.L.M.
at 1131.
"7 See Bhushan Bahree, U.S. Renews Controversial Bid to Tie Labor Principles
to Trade Privileges, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1995, at A9 _(discussing U.S. attempts
to link labor standards with world trade privileges); Guy de Jonquieres &
Robert Taylor, France to Push Workers' Rights in WTO, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1995, at 4 (reporting France's effort to encourage members of the EU to "link
workers' rights and labour standards with the conduct of international trade").
" See Bahree, supra note 87, at A9.
89 See id.
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trade policy is determined, but also could force the creation of
trade policy even further into the public consciousness. The
resulting loss of its low profile might prove disastrous for free
trade.
Several facts indicate the dangers that publicity may have upon
efforts to liberalize trade. First, although the overall economic
effect is usually beneficial, liberalization of trade policy usually
hurts some constituency 0  Wolfgang Stolper and Paul
Samuelson identify the constituencies in a given economy that are
most likely to be harmed by trade liberalization.91 Ronald
Rogowski, in turn, builds upon this foundation a theory that
predicts domestic responses to various proposals for liberalized
trade.12  Not surprisingly, Rogowski also predicts that those
constituencies likely to be harmed by free trade will collaborate
to oppose trade liberalization at the national level.9 3  The
rancorous debates over ratification of the North American Free
Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round support Rogowski's
predictions.94 Indeed, the unusual political coalitions which
opposed ratification of those agreements" indicate a shortcoming
in Rogowski's analysis: he predicts opposition to free trade solely
on economic grounds, whereas much of the opposition actually
stemmed from ideological sources. Whatever the reason for a
90 See, e.g., Robert C. Shelburne & Robert W. Bednarzik, Geographic
Concentration of Trade-Sensitive Employment, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1993,
at 3, 10 (demonstrating differing impacts of trade-related unemployment across
geographic areas).
91 See Wolfgang F. Stolper & Paul A. Samuelson, Protection and Real Wages,
9 REv. EcoN. STUD. 58, 72 (1941) (demonstrating that trade liberalization
harms owners and users of scarce factors and resources in a society).
92 See RONALD ROGOWSKI, COMMERCE AND COALITIONS: How TRADE
AFFECTS DOMESTIC POLrrICAL ALIGNMENTS 1-16, 163-64 (1989).
91 See id. at 4-5 (describing how "beneficiaries of change will try to continue
and accelerate [the domestic political process], while the victims of the same
change will endevour to retard or halt it ... as the desire and the means for a
particular political preference increase, the likelihood grows that political
entrepreneurs will devise mechanisms that can surmount the obstacles to
collective action"); see also Charles K. Rowley & Robert D. Tollison, Rent-
Seeking and Trade Protection, in PROTECTIONISM AND STRUCTURAL ADJUST-
MENT 141, 151-52 (Heinz Hauser ed., 1986) (noting that trade protection results
from political activity of "losers" from free trade).
"' See Sol Mosher, The Politics of World Trade, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 26, 1994,
at 20.
9' See id. (describing the unusual coalition that opposed the North
American Free Trade Agreement).
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position, however, it is abundantly clear that sorting out a
national trade policy can be a contentious affair.
A second fact suggesting the harmful effect of thrusting trade
into the adversarial arena is that once trade policy determination
leaves the national arena, it tends to fall from public view. For
example, the passions within the United States that were generated
by the debate over the ratification of the North American Free
Trade Agreement were not fully replicated in the debate over
ratification of the Uruguay Round.96 The actual functioning of
the World Trade Organization has generated even less interest
than the ratification of the Uruguay Round. Indeed, the negotia-
tion of trade regulations captures more attention than the
adjudication of disputes under those regulations.97
With these two facts in mind - that trade liberalization will
usually harm some domestic constituencies and that attention to
trade policy declines after determination of trade policy leaves the
national arena - at least three problems can be predicted to arise
if standing expands to include nongovernment entities. First,
expansion of standing will undermine the apparent authority, and
thus the ability, of nations to negotiate trade policies. Trade
negotiation is one of the primary functions of the World Trade
Organization.98 Multilateral trade negotiations are, by their very
nature, delicate and time consuming processes.99 Multilateral
trade negotiations are not like any other type of international
negotiations; they are made especially complicated by the Most
Favored Nation principle, which requires that any concession
granted to one country must automatically extend to every other
party. °° Because of this principle, negotiators are reluctant to
9' See Gerald F. Seib, Debate on GA TT Recalls Nafta Battle in Many Ways,
But the Passion Is Gone, WALL ST. 1., July 14, 1995, at A12 (noting that the
"GATT debate hasn't hit a Nafta-like fever pitch in the public arena").
9' See Richard N. Cooper, Trade Policy Is Foreign Policy, 9 FOREIGN POL'Y
18 (1972) (noting how international trade policy is considered low foreign
policy" and receives little national attention-.
9' See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
99 See GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EvOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTs 52-56 (1992) (describing the delicacy and complexity of trade
agreement negotiation).
" The Most Favored Nation principle is defined in the General Agree-
ment:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or
in connection with importation or exportation .. ., any advantage,
[17:1
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proffer concessions, and must evaluate whether the advantages
gained by offering the concession to one country are worth the
loss in leverage over other countries.' The Most Favored
Nation requirement also causes countries to be very reluctant to
enter into negotiations unless the delicate balances they achieve
will be final. 10 2 Indeed, fast track negotiating authority in the
United States" is predicated upon the notion that other coun-
tries are unlikely to negotiate unless the resulting agreements are
immune from congressional amendment.'04
Expansion of standing would undoubtedly lead to the spectacle
of domestic constituencies opposing the positions of the govern-
ments that are supposed to represent those constituencies."05
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product origi-
nating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. I(1), 61 Stat. at A12, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196, 198.
101 See GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO
ROUND NEGOTIATION 62 (1986) (explaining the negotiating tactics of
exchanging concessions).
102 See id. at 58-90.
103 For a brief, but excellent, description of fast track negotiating authority,
see Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143, 143-44 (1992). Fast track negotiating authority
imposes limits on the executive's scope of negotiating powers in exchange for
an agreement by Congress to severely curtail its ability to amend the resulting
ratifcation agreement and implementation legislation. See id. Far from
limiting public input into the negotiations, Koh argues that "[i]n the typical
situation, the Executive Branch develops an initial strategy for negotiating with
our trading partners, but the amended Fast Track process encourages the
President to alter that strategy over time through consultation with private
industry groups and through dialogue with a Congress." Id. at 165; see also
Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, The Fast Track Debate: A Prescription for
Pragmatism, 26 INT'L LAW. 183, 184-86 (1992) (describing the U.S. fast track
procedures and its applications).
104 See Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade
Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191, 1200-
01 (1986) (contending that congressional refusal to authorize advance
negotiating authority made trading partners reluctant to negotiate with the
United States in the 1970s); Koh, supra note 103, at 148 (explaining that fast
track negotiating authority enhances presidential credibility).
105 It is not difficult to envision possible scenarios. The European Union,
for example, plans to ban the importation of furs taken from animals that were
caught in leg hold traps. See Caroline Southey, EU Warns of Fur Trap Ban,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1996, at 5. On the other hand, Wise Use, which consists
of a group of very well-monied environmental nongovernment organizations,
vehemently opposes almost all environmentally friendly legislation. See Mary
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The outcomes of such clashes - and the impact of such clashes
upon the domestic politics of member counties - would be
unpredictable. Allowing private parties that were not successful
when values and goals were balanced at the national level to have
standing before dispute settlement parties would create an
irreconcilable dissonance for countries engaged in the delicate
process of trade negotiation. Countries would face one position
at the negotiating table and another in tribunals. In turn, this
would create uncertainty about a country's true position and cause
reluctance by trading partners to negotiate with that country.
The second harm raised by the expansion of standing is
inequity. Advocating a position in a domestic forum costs time,
effort, skill, and money.1 6 Likewise, advocating a position in
an international forum is not free from significant costs."07
Only those interest groups whose resources were not exhausted at
the domestic level could take advantage of standing before the
World Trade Organization. In other words, rather than resulting
in a democratization of trade policymaking, expansion of standing
L. Gallagher, Wise Use or Wise Marketing, PLANNING, Jan. 1996, at 4; Kevin
Carmody, Environmental Backlash - Big Bucks Behind It, SACRAMENTO BEE,
June 25, 1995, at F2. The U.S. government also has indicated that it opposes
the ban on importation of leg-caught fur. See European Commission to Propose
Delay in Banning Some Fur Imports Until 1997, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1972
_(Nov. 29, 1995). If the United States changed its position and- agreed to the
legality of the ban, it would almost certainly ask for some concession in
exchange. If standing were extended to nongovernmental entities, it is likely
that Wise Use would seek on its own, or would join the action of another
group seeking to have the ban ruled to be violative of a trade agreement. If
Wise Use was successful, the United States would nonetheless retain the quid
pro quo for its concession. This clash would appear at best to be a coincidence
and at worst to be collusive. In either case, the European Union would be less
likely to deal with the United States in the future.
This, of course, is but one example. As the World Trade Organization
explores the intersections between trade and other social values and goals,
hundreds of issues will arise on which governments will be required to take
positions. To the extent that democracy works, these positions will reflect a
consensus of or synthesis of the values of citizens.
106 See Barbara A. Phillips & Anthony C. Piazza, The Role of Mediation in
Public Interest Disputes, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1231, 1242 (1983) (stating that public
interest litigation is costly and time consuming).
107 For example, advocating a position in the World Trade Organization
dispute resolution process incudes the consultation, panel, interim panel
review, and appellate review stages. See Understanding, supra note 7, arts. 4,
6, 12, 15-17, 20, 33 I.L.M. at 1228-38. To complete this process, no less than
hundreds of hours of skilled advocates are needed over the course of an entire
year, at the bare minimum.
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might instead be a boon to a select group of well-monied interest
groups.
Determining which constituencies could appear before a panel
adjudicating a dispute also raises questions of equity. The
environmental movement provides a good example of the
difficulties created by expanded standing. Although a precise
numerical count is impossible, the United States alone is home to
literally thousands of groups with environmental orientations 0 8
Similarly, hundreds, if not thousands, of international nongovern-
mental organizations and nationally based nongovernmental
organizations deal with environmental issues at the international
level.' 9  Believing that any one of these environmental groups
could speak for all of them would display a profound ignorance
of the environmental movement. In the rawest of terms,
significant differences exist between recreationalists, conservation-
ists, and preservationists. "° At the same time, a trade dispute
panel cannot possibly hear from thousands of groups. The
process of winnowing down this list to a manageable group of
parties will involve normative and evaluative decisions that will
be, at best, judgmental and, at worst, arbitrary.'
Finally, and most seriously, expansion of standing might cause
the World Trade Organization to move away from, or be unable
to pursue, the goal of free trade. It can be argued that the low
public profile of international trade policy has been one of the
largest contributors to trade liberalization over the past fifty years.
10 See, e.g., Joel Bleifuss, The Grassroots Are Greener, UTNE READER, July-
Aug. 1994, at 78 (claiming that an information clearinghouse organization
works with over 8,000 environmental groups).
109 See CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF PUBLC AFFAIRS, WORLD DIRECTORY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 17-28, 91-164 (Thaddeus C. Trzyna ed.,
1989) (categorizing environmental organizations by area of interest and
nationaliti)a
110 Recreationalists press for immediate use of environmental resources,
conservationists press for future use of environmental resources, and
preservationists press for preservation of environments. See Philip M. Nichols,
Trade, Values and Differentiating Trade Sanctions: A Commentary on the Free
Trade-Fair Trade Debate, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Alan 0. Sykes & Jagdeep S. Bhandiri eds., forthcoming July 1996).
.. Indeed, unless Professor Shell proposes to extend standing to any and
all who seek it, including individuals, then he is not really advocating a system
of participatory government. He is instead proposing a system in which repre-
sentation by governments will be replaced with representation by special
interest groups.
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Although trade liberalization usually increases aggregate welfare,
it must survive a serious gauntlet from conception to implementa-
tion. Both the beneficiaries of inefficient industries that could not
survive competition and the recipients of monopolistic and
oligopolistic rents that are created by protectionist laws generally
oppose free trade.112  Frequently, these interest groups are
extremely adept at mobilizing resources against the implementa-
tion of trade liberalizing policies."' In contrast, the beneficiaries
of trade liberalization are far more diffuse and may not fully
realize the benefits they gain from free trade.114  These diffuse
and unknowing beneficiaries are less likely to mobilize resources
to advocate implementation of free trade and oppose protectionist
measures.1 ' Based on this reasoning, Daniel Verdier notes that
the President, who is responsible to the entire nation, is generally
more supportive of trade liberalization than Senators or Represen-
tatives who are more vulnerable to special interest constituencies
within their jurisdictions116
The international trade regime provides a buffer between the
makers of trade policy and special interest groups. Having sorted
out trade policy issues at the national level, bureaucrats are free to
cooperate with other governments to maximize national and
global welfare without the intrusion of special interests."7
112 See Rowley & Tollison, supra note 93, at 143 (stating that artificial rents
result from government intervention "designed to protect incumbent
monopolists from rent-removing competitive entry").
113 See Shell, supra note 37, at 878-79 (stating that uncompetitive producers
"mobilize labor and other constituencies to protect them from foreign
competition").
114 See Rowley & Tollison, supra note 93, at 152 (noting that beneficiaries
of trade liberalization lack incentives to gather information, organize, or vote).
115 See id. at 151; see also Atlas, supra note 70, at C1 ("A person who loses
his job because of import competition knows [why he lost his job].., but the
guys on both sides of his house don't necessarily know that their jobs exist, in
part, because their employer is an exporter.") (quoting Robert McNeill, who
heads the Emergency Committee for American Trade).
116 See VERDIER, supra note 79, at 275 (arguing that Congress needed the
President's help to "keep special interests at bay").
S117 See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions
Sthe Law of International Trade, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501, 517 (1985)
(describing the differential pressures faced by bureaucrats and elected officials).
Although remnants of protectionism remain frustratingly stubborn, it cannot
be denied that efforts to liberalize trade have been very successful. "The
various rounds of multilateral trade negotiations have reduced tariffs to overall
levels at which they no longer create a serious obstacle to trade." Claus-Dieter
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Allowing special interest groups to have standing before dispute
settlement panels would obviate that buffer and subject
policymakers to another level of protectionist pressure from
special interest groups.
This pressure would be exacerbated by the mobilization of
special interest resources that might be engendered by expanding
standing to include those groups. Proceedings before dispute
panels would present enticing avenues for blocking trade liberal-
ization. Success before a panel could result in an immediate
scaling back of trade liberalization, and thus would be worthy of
special effort by a protectionist interest group. Even if protection-
ist groups were unsuccessful, however, the panel proceedings
themselves would evoke the emotional commitment inherent in
a trial. Whereas victories by special interest groups would
immediately impede trade, losses might become rallying cries for
later - and much more extensive - damage to the international
trading system." 8
5. COMPARISON OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION TO
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Professor Shell uses the European Union as a template for the
Ehlermann, The International Dimension of Competition Policy, 17 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 833, 840 (1994). Indeed, much of the global prosperity since the
1940s can be attributed to the liberalization of trade rules. See JAGDISH
BHAGWATI, PROTEcTIONIsM 7-9 (1988) (refuting alternate explanations to trade
liberalization for post-war income growth); ANNE 0. KRUEGER, PERSPECTIVES
ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 206-12 (1990) (estimating, for example, that
removing exchange controls could cause the value of Turkish manufacturing
output per unit of new investment to "almost double").
11 Rather than one Tuna/Dolphin decision every 40 years, the World
Trade Organization might be faced with 40, or even 400, every year. See Belina
Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental Protection Policy, 66
TEMPLE L. REv. 751, 751 (1993) (reporting environmentalists' vigorous
condemnation of the Tuna/Dolphin decision and noting that some groups
"even called for reconsideration of the entire trade regime"). The 7-u-
na/Dolphin decisions ruled that the United States' practice of barring the
importation of tuna from countries that killed more than 1.25 times the
number of dolphins killed by the U.S. tuna fleet violated the General
Agreement. Notably, the two Tuna/Dolphin decisions, which did not reflect
gredominant values of some countries, including the United States, never
ecame GATT law. See Nichols, supra note 110 (noting that the decision of
the dispute resolution panel was never submitted for the approval of the
contracting parties and therefore never became GATT law).
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future of the World Trade Organization.119  Comparisons
between the World Trade Organization and the European Union
are inevitable and, at times, useful.12 For purposes of standing,
however, comparisons between the European Union - which in
some cases allows private entities to have standing before the
European Court of Justice - and the World Trade Organization
are meaningless.
The critical difference between the two entities is found in
their names. The European Union is a union. Its functions
transcend simple trade; it also facilitates social, political, and
regulatory integration.12 ' Economic integration must be distin-
guished from economic cooperation; the hard lesson of the
European Union is that economic integration is not possible
without each of these other forms of integration.12 A mere
desire for economic integration, however, will not necessarily lead
to social integration. Of the approximately seventy regional
trading arrangements,123 none has achieved the level of integra-
tion found in the European Union. Observers attribute the
European Union's integration not to extant laws or economic
policies, but instead to a commonality of values, experiences, and
perspectives. 24 Simply stated, the European Union is integrated
because, among other things, it is integratable.
The World Trade Organization is an organization, not a
119 See Shell, supra note 37, at 922.
120 See, e.g., Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, State Aid Control in the European
Union: Success or Failure, 18 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1212, 1213 (1995) (explaining
that GATT subsidies code drew from the experience of European Union state
aid controls).
121 See STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW 23 (1993)
(The aspirations of the Union . .. encompass economic, social and political
mattr..
"2 Cf Nichols, supra note 10, at 706-07 ("[It is no more possible to
extricate an economy from the social mores in which it is embedded than it is
to pull all of the bones out of a living chicken.").
12 See Richard Harmsen & Michael Leidy, Regional Trading Arrangements,
in 2 INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICIES: THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND
88, 107-16 (Naheed Kirmani et al. eds, 1994) (documenting 68 agreements,
ranging from promises of economic cooperation to complete economic union).
124 See Philip Allott, The European Community Is Not the True European
Community, 100 YALE L.J. 2485, 2492 (1991) ([D]emocracy... [as a] system
for communalizing all socially significant decisionmaking in accordance with
a society's highest values ... has come to seem natural and normal to most
people in Western Europe.").
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union. The goal of the World Trade Organization is to facilitate
economic cooperation, not economic integration,"' and certain-
ly not political or social integration. Moreover, the 128 constitu-
ency countries of the World Trade Organization 126 are located
throughout the globe. While exploring societal and cultural
differences is beyond the scope of this article, it is safe to assume
that the European commonalities are not replicated on a panglobal
scale. 127
The European Court of Justice also differs markedly from
dispute settlement panels and from the Dispute Settlement Body,
which administers those panels. 128  The European Court of
Justice is a permanent institution, distinct and independent of
other European Union institutions. The fifteen members of the
European Court of Justice serve renewable six-year terms,129
enjoy lifetime immunity,3 ' and cannot be removed from the
12 See, e.g., Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organiza-
tion to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking,
reprinted in LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 58 (referring to "harmony," "coherence,"
and "cooperation").
126 A year after its birth, the World Trade Organization has 112 members,
plus another 16 which have not yet converted their old GATT memberships,
but have joined the World Trade Organization in all but name. See Knock,
Knock, supra note 84, at 74. The waiting list of countries that have applied for
World Trade Organization membership now stands at 27. See id.
127 In fact, one need not travel too far from Europe to find a culture that
does not share the European commonalities. Turkey, which is strategically
vital and economically important to Europe, is consistently denied membership
in the European Union because of, among other things, a lack of common
values. See john Barham, Survey of Turkey: The Customs Union with Europe,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1996, at 26. It is possible that Turkey, which does share
some European values and 41% of whose citizens consider the country to be
European, John Barham, The Customs Union With Europe: Rumbles in the East
as the Gate Opens, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1996, at 25, will join the European
Union and will become even more culturally integrated with Europe. While
welcoming increased stability in Turkey, those who have stood in the silent
streets of Konya during noon prayers, or who have enjoyed the shade of the
little villages outside Kayseri, or who have celebrated nightly feasts of Ramadan
by Lake Van, will be saddened.
"2 See Understanding, supra note 7, art. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1226 ("The Dispute
Settlement Body is hereby established to administer these rules and procedures
and ... the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered agree-
ments.").
I29 See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
[EEC TREATY] art. 167.
13 See Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European
Economic Community, Apr. 17, 1957, art. 3, 298 U.N.T.S. 147, 148 (1958),
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bench except for extreme cause.131 The Court has jurisdiction
over a number of direct actions.1 2 The Court also has jurisdic-
tion, at the request of a litigating party, to issue rulings regarding
interpretation of European Union law in proceedings that
originated and will terminate in domestic courts.'33 This means
of jurisdiction accounts for "roughly half" of the privately
initiated proceedings brought before the European Court of
Justice, 114 and is the avenue through which the Court most often
has refined its jurisprudence. 35
In contrast, the Dispute Settlement Board consists of the
General Council - the legislative assembly of the organization -
functioning under a different name.'36 The dispute settlement
panels themselves are created on an ad hoc basis. 37  Parties to
a dispute may, but need not, appeal a decision of a dispute panel
to the Appellate Body, which consists of seven appointees with
four-year terms who hear appeals in three-judge panels. 3 A
amended by 22 OJ Eur. Comm. No. L291/9 (1979).
131 See id. art. 6, 298 U.N.T.S. at 14849.
132 These include direct actions: against a member state for failure to fulfill
an obligation under various treaties or derived legislation; by the Council of
Ministers for annulment of a European Union measure; by a Member state or
a European Union institution against another institution for failure to take a
required action; and against penalties imposed by the Union or for damages
against the Union. See JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL REASONING
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN JURISPRU-
DENCE 14-15 (1993).
133 See id.
134 Most of these proceedings are brought under article 177 of the EEC
Treaty. See id.
135 See id. ("This indirect action has been the main source of clarification
and development of EC law.").
136 See Charter, supra note 6, art. IV(3), 33 I.L.M. at 1145. While it is
functioning as the Dispute Settlement Body, the General Council may take on
a different chairperson. See id.
137 See Understanding, supra note 7, art. 6(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1230 (providing
for the establishment of a dispute resolution panel "[i]f the complaining party
so requests").
138 See id. art. 17, 33 I.L.M. at 1236. The rotation of Appellate Body
members is coordinated so that three members will always be aval'able. See id.
art. 17(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1236. Judges of the Appellate Body must represent the
World Trade Organization membership andlinclude "recognized" experts in
law, international trade, and the subject matter in dispute. See id. art. 17(3), 33
I.L.M. at 1236. Jurisdiction of the Appellate Body is limited to "issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel."
Id. art. 17(6), 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
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dispute settlement panel may be convened when a member
country feels that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly
under one of the trade agreements annexed to the World Trade
Organization Charter is being nullified or impaired. 39
Dispute settlement panels are an integral, and integrated,
component of the trade regulation process. Historically, panels
proceeding under the General Agreement were consciously
circumspect in their proceedings. 4° A core principle by which
the panels operated was that their role was simply "to make
findings regarding [the] interpretation and application" 141 of the
trade instruments, even when the issue involved a provision that
was facially not viable or was widely disliked. 42 This principle
led at least one panel to caution that its ruling should be taken
merely as an interpretation of the existing provisions, and should
have no bearing on negotiations involving the provision in
question.'43
139 See id. arts. 3(3), 23, 33 I.L.M. at 1227, 1241. The trade agreements
annexed to the World Trade Organization Charter are: the Multilateral
Agreement on Trade in Goods, which includes the General Agreement as
amended and now known as GATT 1994, see Charter, supra note 6, Annex 1A,
33 I.L.M. at 1154; the General Agreement on Trade in Services, see id. Annex
1B, 33 I.L.M. at 1167; and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property, see id. Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. at 1197.
140 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional
Reform in the New GAT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 479 (1994) (stating that
dispute settlement under GATT primarily "aim[ed] at lowering tensions,
diffusing conflicts, and promoting compromise").
141 Canada, Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, Dec. 5, 1989,
GATT BISD 36th Supp. 68, 85 (1990).
"' See id. at 85 (discussing member nations' dissatisfaction with, and efforts
to revise the terms of, GATT Article XI:2(c)(i, an exception to the article
under which the United States brought the spute against Canada). The
understanding, of course, was that the broader issues would then be discussed
by all of the parties to the General Agreement, who could then debate those
issues and modify the trade agreements as appropriate. Indeed, although many
have applauded the fact that Mexico declined to proffer the contentious
Tuna/Dolphin panel decision for a vote by the parties to the General
Agreement, that decision has also been criticized. "[T]he Panel Report affected
all members of the General Agreement and failure to more forward on the
report was blocking progress on the larger debate regarding the relationship
between trade development and environmental protection." Stanley M.
Spracker & David C. Lundsgaard, Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed Attention on the
Future of Free Trade and Protection of the Environment, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 385, 386 n.7 (1993) (attributing argument to the European Community).
143 See European Economic Community, Regulation on Imports of Parts
and Components, May 16, 1990, GATT BISD 37th Supp. 132, 199 (1991)
1996]
31
Nichols: Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Non
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
By contrast, the European Court of Justice is not restricted to
an interpretive role, but exercises discretion over the substantive
development of binding principles. As two European commenta-
tors note:
The Court of Justice plays a significant role in the develop-
ment of the European Communities, to some extent
comparable with the role of the Supreme Court in the
early years of the United States of America. Both are
constitutional courts charged with the preservation and the
development of the law in a new society.144
It would be difficult to make such a grandiloquent claim for
dispute settlement panels.
Although the European Court of Justice and World Trade
Organization dispute panels both hold hearings and resolve
disputes, dispute settlement panels are not courts and are not
meant to be courts. To have standing to appear before the
European Court of Justice is to have standing to appear before a
court; to have standing to appear before a World Trade Organi-
zation dispute panel is not. It is fair, of course, to argue in the
hypothetical that effective international trade governance requires
the creation of a true international trade court, but that is a much
different - and much more hypothetical - argument than is the
debate over standing before dispute resolution panels. Neither
expansion of standing nor an increase in the formal trappings of
the Dispute Settlement Body, however, will transform that Body
into a true court. The creation of a court would require the
creation of a new and distinct organ in the World Trade Organi-
zation. Moreover, the many arguments against expanding
standing before dispute settlement panels would be equally
applicable to standing before such a court.
(noting concurrent negotiations over the administration of anti-dumping laws
and emphasizing that its task was limited to interpreting "the existing
provisions of the General Agreement").
144 HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTEC-
TION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1 (5th ed. 1992) (footnote omitted).
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6. CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIZING THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
There can be little doubt that the World Trade Organization
shall and should deal with the interface between trade and other
global issues. Its forays into the realm of social regulation,
however, must for the moment be circumscribed. When the
concept of sovereignty has lost all utility, when cultural differenc-
es have been minimalized, and when all societies have roughly the
same set of values, then perhaps it will be possible and desirable
for the World Trade Organization to shoulder Shell's proposed
role as arbiter of social policy. At the present time, however, the
World Trade Organization would collapse under the weight of
societal differences, and the benefits of trade liberalization would
be lost.
141
Similarly, calls for expanding the scope of standing before
World Trade Organization dispute resolution panels should be
heeded with caution. If, in the course of the World Trade
Organization's evolution, a body of international trade law
applicable to individuals develops, then expanded standing may
become desirable. At the moment, however, such calls are
suspect. Far from "democratizing" the process, expanded standing
could create a forum only for well-monied special interest groups.
In all likelihood, those groups would be more concerned with
protecting their advantaged positions than in working for the
common good.
The World Trade Organization is not the undemocratic
institution that Professor Shell depicts; rather, it is a form of
democracy with which Professor Shell is unhappy.1 46  None-
145 Alternatively, if the World Trade Organization were able to formulate
and impose a social charter, the organization would lose legitimacy in the eyes
of those cultures whose values the charter transgressed. As a result, the World
Trade Organization would ultimately lose both its viability as an international
organization and the benefits of trade liberalization.
146 Shell's unhappiness with the World Trade Organization's form of
democracy is somewhat surprising. The one country-one vote system that Shell
castigates as "relatively primitive," Shell, supra note 37, at 922, is no different
from that used in the U.S. Senate, or in the European Union's Council of
Ministers. Indeed, Professor Robert Hudec has argued, albeit in a different
context, that international negotiation of trade policy is no less "democratic"
than the creation of policy through the ordinary legislative process. Robert E.
Hudec, "Circumventing"Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade Negotiations,
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theless, the fact that the World Trade Organization is democratic
does not mean that it is perfect. The international trade regime
has been roundly criticized for myopically exalting trade above
other social values. 147 The impulse to legitimize the World
Trade Organization by bringing its decisions into line with
prevailing values (within reasonable moral bounds) is laudable.
Popular perception of the World Trade Organization as illegiti-
mate could threaten the organization's ability to function, even to
the point of collapse.
14 1
In order best to protect other interests - including societal
values - it is not, however, standing that should be expanded, but
rather the composition of the dispute settlement panels themselves
that should be changed. The Understanding on Dispute Settle-
ment tilts composition of panels towards trade experts and, in
practice, panels have been composed entirely of trade bureaucrats
and scholars.14 9  However, by stating that "[planels shall be
composed of well-qualified governmental and/or nongovernmental
individuals, including" - as opposed to "limited to" - various
types of trade experts, the Understanding does allow room for
nontrade experts to sit on panels.150 This window must be
taken advantage of; experts in fields other than trade must be
added to dispute resolution panels. While the majority of panel
members should continue to be trade experts, there also must be
thoughtful interpretation of and proper attention given to
nontrade values by those most qualified to make such contribu-
tions. In a dispute that involves trade restrictions on products
produced by child labor, for example, an official from the
International Labour Organization could be included on the panel;
25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311, 312 (1993) (comparing the legitimacy of
negotiated trade and domestic legislation).
147 See Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade-Free Trade
Debate: Trade, Labour and the Environment, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 110 ("[F]ree traders have, in general, been
too cavalier in their summary rejection of arguments that trade, environment,
and labour should be linked."); Nichols, supra note 10, at 700.
148 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 707-09. Howse and Trebilcock put it far
more prosaically: "If international trade law simply rules out of court any trade
response to the policies of other countries, however abhorrent, then there will
be an understandable, and dangerous, temptation to declare that international
trade law is an ass." Howse & Trebilcocl, supra note 147, at 3.
149 See Understanding, supra note 7, art. 8(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1231.
150 Id. (emphasis added).
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in a dispute over an environmental measure, an international
environmental scholar could join the panel.
The World Trade Organization inherits from the GATT a
world in which trade plays a vital role. Because trade is a central
activity in human endeavors, the World Trade Organization must
not turn a blind eye toward trade's connection with other social
issues. Myopia, however, is cured not by changing what the eye
is shown, but instead by changing how the eye sees. Changes in
the World Trade Organization ultimately will depend not on who
comes before its dispute panels, but instead on who makes the
decisions.
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